The V4 and the Security of NATO’s Eastern Flank

On November 22, 2022, the Euro-Atlantic Center organised e-learning titled The V4 and the Security of NATO’s Eastern Flank, as a part of the project Visegrad Youth Forum 2022. Barbora Maronková, the Communications Advisor on NATO’s Strategic Concept,  took the floor as a speaker at the last e-learning of the Visegrad Youth Forum 2022. 

Ms Maronková began the discussion by talking about NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv where she had worked before the war started. She explained that her main job there was to communicate about NATO through different tools, for instance by travelling around the country and giving lectures at universities or by engaging with the local press. Ms Maronková stressed that it was an exciting opportunity considering she could have a direct approach to Ukrainian citizens. The second NATO Information and Documentation Centre was in Moscow for almost 20 years. A year ago, considering well-known events, NATO was forced to close its office in Moscow. 

According to Ms Maronková, NATO – the Russia relationship started to suffer many years prior to the conflict. The watershed moment on the 24th of February 2022 definitively broke off any remaining cooperation between NATO and Russia, including military and practical cooperation. NATO received a clear message from Russian Federation that there is no desire to communicate with them. Regarding the pledge to strengthen Eastern Flank, NATO has enhanced its Forward Presence in three Baltic states and Poland. This resulted in the increase of military drills in the Baltic and Black sea.

Russian aggression in Ukraine was a wake-up call for NATO countries that they can not take their security and defence for granted. It is important for countries to commit a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product to defence spending to 

continue to ensure the Alliance’s military readiness. In the view of Ms Maronková, a lot of work still needs to be done. We need to improve not only military mobility but also ensure rapid relocation of the equipment in order to help Eastern Flank within the shortest time possible if needed. These efforts have already started since 2014, but there is still a lot that needs to be improved. NATO Allies need to produce more, so it could send more weapons to Ukraine, and also have enough for its own defence. 

At the Madrid Summit in June 2022, a new Strategic Concept was adopted by NATO Allies, saying what NATO should focus on and how it should adapt. New Strategic Concept was very needed because the previous one was adopted 12 years ago, in 2010. Since then, the geopolitical situation has changed. Even in 2010, after the Russian invasion of Georgia, Russia was still perceived as a strategic partner for NATO. There was a hope for change in Russia’s behaviour, but nothing had changed and allies perceive Russia as the biggest security threat now. 

In the second part, the speaker explained her point of view on what might have caused the mental switch of Finland and Sweden in terms of joining the Alliance. She explained that both countries were close partners to NATO, they even participated in operations in Kosovo or Afghanistan, but they made a point they are neutral and NATO was fine with it. The sudden decision within a couple of weeks after the Russian invasion was quite a surprise for everyone. Special was the fact that the will to become NATO members was coming from the citizens. No decision was made by the Prime Minister or Government, it was all coming from the citizen level. Paradoxically, the Russian Federation was against NATO expansion when it attacked Ukraine, but now NATO has 2 new member states that are politically strong and defence-wise.

The Swedish and Finnish military and security sectors are in line with NATO, they had also integrated with NATO informally in many ways. From this perspective, Ms Maronková believes that their acceptance of NATO is not an issue.

From a political perspective, clearly, there is a point that all the member states have to ratify the membership. At the moment the process is almost completed. Turkey had some objections when it came to the membership of two new states. In terms of fighting terrorism, the agreement was signed at the Madrid Summit. Turkey, Finland and Sweden are now fulfilling this agreement.

In the third part, Ms Maronková discussed a possible scenario of NATO becoming a guarantor of peace in Ukraine. She is not sure if this will be acceptable because of NATO’s mandate, since NATO gives guarantees only to member states. Whether NATO as an institution would be able to act as a guarantor we do not know. In her view, the Russian Federation would not allow this scenario. 

The speaker also highlighted unprecedented humanitarian, financial and economic support to Ukraine. Every country contributes how it can. Some countries with military supplies, some countries particularly serve as transit points, and some are hosting Ukrainian people and providing continued support. Countries are allowing Ukrainians to register as citizens, which allows them to look for work or seek medical assistance. NATO, specifically, launched the Comprehensive Assistance Package, which is a continuation of a package that was implemented before the war started. It consists of non-military aid, everything that the Ukrainians need except weapons, such as winter clothes, communication systems, fuel or medical kits.

You were a coordinator of a program in Brussels which aimed to increase information about NATO. Do you suggest that article 5 is an effective tool, in general? Or does it have some defects? Example: if every country supports the article under the pressure of other members, does this country have a possibility to say I am out now?

All the decisions are taken by consensus. So either we all agree on Article 5 or there is no Article 5 applied. However, there are different ways and options. You can also 

have a situation, that we had back in 2010 in Libya when we had a political consensus for NATO as an organization to approve No-Fly Zone over Libya. So politically, it was ratified by all member states. But not all the member states have participated militarily in this operation. Luckily, so far, we didn‚t have to experiment with Article 5 in this sense, the only time to pre-invoke Article 5 in our long history was actually in support of the USA on 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Since 1993 when the common foreign and security policy within the Maastricht Treaty has been established, nowadays we see the debate concerning the common EU military has emerged more than ever. How to avoid duplication within Europe when it comes to the fact that 21 members of the EU are already Allies members of NATO and what are the key areas of cooperation between the EU and NATO?

Obviously, if we look at the map, NATO is Northern America and most of the European Union with few exceptions. The fact that the EU is strong enough to step up its own defence is really important to NATO. In principle, it is very much welcomed that the EU is being very serious about European Common Defense. What NATO would not like to see is duplication. By duplication, we mean creating control structures which are running parallel to NATO. There is a lot we can do together. We need to be able to support each other in the best way of us can. Particularly, with the ongoing war in Ukraine, the cooperation and coordination between the EU and NATO have been very good.

Map of NATO´s Eastern Flank – distribution of forces, Map was presented during the e-learning 

https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/3/pdf/2203-map-det-def-east.pdf